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I.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of Case

Plaintiff/Appellant Terry Kerr ("Kerr") has no legal claim to the real property at issue,
yet he seeks to delay foreclosure proceedings under a host of meritless theories.
Respondents/Defendants Bank of America, N.A. ("BANA") and ReconTrust Company,
N.A. ("ReconTrust") (collectively, "Bank of America") acted lawfully in commencing
foreclosure proceedings upon a property located at 3501 Madeline Ct., Ammon, Idaho 83406
(the "Ammon Property") pursuant to a mortgage contract executed by Jerry Jones ("Jones")
when Jones defaulted on his loan obligations. After Bank of America instituted foreclosure
proceedings, Kerr recorded a quitclaim deed to a one-half interest in the Ammon Property and a
limited power of attorney given to him by Jerry Jones. Thereafter, Kerr filed the current action
against Bank of America alleging seven causes of action arising from the foreclosure. Kerr also
made several wild, unsubstantiated allegations against Bank of America and its lawyers for
plotting to kill or injure him and members of his family.
The District Court considered Kerr's allegations and correctly dismissed them as
insufficient to state any claim upon which relief could be granted.
B.

Course of Proceedings
1.

Kerr Files His Complaint.

Terry Kerr filed a Complaint against BANA and ReconTrust on or about August 12,
2012 in the District Court for the Seventh Judicial District of Idaho. 1 In his Complaint, Kerr

IR., p. 7.
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alleged seven causes of action.2 In his first claim for relief, Kerr alleged that Bank of America
violated "the Plaintiffs [sic.] Fair Debt Collections Practices Act, and the Deceptive Trade
Practices Act," as well as the "Privacy Act."3 In his second claim for relief, Kerr asserted that
Bank of America "did violate the Consumer Protection Act, and the Breach of the Implied
Covenant did cause intentional infliction of financial and emotional distress." 4 Kerr's third claim
for relief was for "interference with prospective economic advantage."

5

In his fourth claim for

relief, Kerr contended that Bank of America "did bad faith and malicious misconduct to cause
the Plaintiff intentional infliction of emotional and financial distress." 6 The fifth claim for relief
was for civil conspiracy. 7

In his sixth claim for relief, Kerr alleged "breach of the Idaho

Deceptive Practices Act along with wrongfull [sic.], wanton, reckless, and intentional extreme
malicious conduct[.]"8 Kerr's final claim for relief alleges defamation against Bank of America.
In support of his claims, Kerr alleged that he owned a one half interest in the Ammon
Property with his son Dennis which was quitclaimed to him by Jerry Jones. 9 Kerr asserted that
Bank of America foreclosed on the loan obligation of Jones which was secured by the Property. 10
Kerr alleged various perceived wrongs against Jones in the servicing of Jones' s loan. 11 Kerr

R., pp. 16-19.
R., p. 16.
4 Id.
5 R., p. 17.
6 Id.
7 R., pp. 17-18
8 R., p. 18.
9 R., pp. 18-19
lO R., pp. 10-16.
11 R., pp. 9-14.
2

3
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continued on to make allegations regarding the servicing of a loan on an unrelated property
owned by his son Dennis Kerr in Sparks/Reno, Nevada. 12 Kerr's other allegations relate to
assertions of political corruption, violence against his young children and racism which he
alleged were funded by Bank of America and its lawyers. 13 Kerr contended that this alleged
treatment was occasioned by his filing of a previous lawsuit against Bank of America in
Bonneville County, Idaho (Case No. cv-09-3143) for "selling his personal banking information,
doing non posted deposits, and even putting WTO holds on his cash deposits to see if his cash
would clear, just to produce wrongfull [sic.] and illegal fees. This case went on for years and the
Bank of America made Terry Kerr the target of vengeance." 14 Kerr also referenced a separate
lawsuit allegedly filed in Washoe County Nevada (Case No. cv-12-02029) in regard to the
property owned by Dennis Kerr. 15
On or about September 6, 2012, Kerr filed a Motion for a Change of Venue. 16 In his
Motion, Kerr alleged that he could not get a fair trial in the Seventh Judicial District because he
did not prevail in a previous action against BANA before Judge Jon Shindurling and due to
allegations of violence and poisonings relating to himself and his family members purportedly
occurring in Bonneville County. 17 Judge Shindurling denied Kerr's Motion for Change of Venue

i2R., p. 9.
R., pp. 8-16
14 R., p. 11.
is Id.
16 R., p. 25.
17 R., pp. 25-29.
13
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on September 10, 2012. 18 Kerr filed a Motion for Reconsideration on September 12, 2012. 19
Judge Shindurling denied the Motion for Reconsideration on September 17, 2012. 20

2.

Bank of America Files a Motion to Dismiss.

Thereafter, on September 24, 2012, Bank of America filed a Motion to Dismiss Kerr's
Complaint and a Supporting Memorandum. 21 Prior to addressing each of Kerr's claims
individually, Bank of America argued that: (1) any claims relating to Dennis Kerr's property in
Nevada should be dismissed due to the pending litigation filed in Nevada;

22

(2) Kerr lacked

standing to assert any claims on behalf of Jones because he did not assume Jones's loan
obligation and because Jones's limited power of attorney did not authorize Kerr to institute
claims on Jones's behalf; 23 (3) Kerr's claims were barred by res judicata; 24 and (4) Kerr failed to
state claims for contract based offenses where he did not allege the existence of a contract
between himself and BANA or ReconTrust. 25
Bank of America then addressed Kerr's seven asserted claims and other claims implied in
the Complaint but not actually delineated, including an alleged violation of the Servicemembers
Civil Relief Act. 26

In response, Kerr filed an Opposition to Bank of America's Motion to

18 R., p. 50.
19R.,p. 4.
20 R., p. 52.
21 R., p. 4.
22 Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, pp. 4-5, included in Augmented Record on
Appeal.
23 Id., pp. 5-6.
24 Id., pp. 6-8.
25 Id., pp. 8-9.
26 Id., pp. 9-18.
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Dismiss on October 31, 2012. 27 Kerr did not address any of Bank of America's arguments in his
Opposition. 28

Instead, Kerr asserted that Judge Shindurling should recuse himself from the

case. 29 Kerr continued to allege that acts of violence were committed against his younger sons
and that he would continue to file lawsuits in protest of the alleged wrongs committed against
him. 30
Thereafter, on November 5, 2012, Judge Shindurling disqualified himself from further
proceedings in the matter. 31 After striking another judge in Bonneville County, Kerr was finally
granted his Motion for Change of Venue to the Sixth Judicial District Court in Bannock County
by a third judge. 32 The case was filed in Bannock County on May 6, 2013. 33 Judge Stephen
Dunn held a hearing on Bank of America's Motion to Dismiss on August 12, 2013. 34

3.

The District Court Dismisses Kerr's Complaint.

On September 9, 2013, Judge Dunn issued a Decision dismissing all of Kerr's claims. 35
Judge Dunn limited his decision to the seven claims actually asserted by Kerr in his Complaint
reasoning that "any other claims which may be inferred from the complaint have not been
sufficiently pleaded to put the Court or Defendants on notice as to what claims are actually being

Opposition to Defendants Motion to Dismiss included in Augmented Record on Appeal.
Id., generally.
29 Id., pp. 1-2.
30 Id., p. 2.
31 R., p. 53.
32 R., pp. 5; 62.
33 R., p. 2.
34 R., p. 2.
35 R., pp. 2; 87.
27

28
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brought. " 36 In reviewing Kerr's claims, Judge Dunn noted that the first cause of action for
violation of "The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," "The Deceptive Trade Practices Act," and
"The Privacy Act" failed because the allegations of the Complaint were not sufficient to put the
opposing party on notice as to what was actually being alleged. 37 Judge Dunn noted that he
treated Bank of America's assertion of the defense of res judicata as a motion for summary
judgment because it required examination of documents outside of the pleadings in the case. 38
After examining the record based on that standard, Judge Dunn determined that the first claim
was barred from being re-litigated by the doctrine of res judicata and, thus, he dismissed the first
cause of action with prejudice. 39 Judge Dunn dismissed Kerr's third, fifth and seventh causes of
action without prejudice for failure to properly allege the elements of the claims.40 Judge Dunn
dismissed Kerr's second, fourth and sixth claims with prejudice for lack of standing because
Kerr failed to allege the existence of a contract between him and either BANA or ReconTrust. 41

4.

Kerr Files a Motion for Reconsideration.

On or about September 26, 2013, Kerr filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
Judge Dunn abused his discretion in dismissing Kerr's Complaint. 42

On or about October 11,

2013, Bank of America filed an Opposition to Kerr's Motion for Reconsideration. 43 Bank of

R., p. 75-76.
R., p. 78.
38 R., p. 79.
39 R., pp. 79; 87.
40 R., pp. 81-84; 87.
41 R., pp. 84-87.
42 R., pp. 89-338.
43 R., pp. 340-344.
36
37
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America contended that the Motion should be denied because Kerr failed to introduce any new
evidence and simply recounted his failed arguments once more. 44 The District Court denied
Kerr's Motion by Memorandum Decision dated October 28, 2013 finding that there was no
"legitimate factual or legal basis upon which its prior decision should be reconsidered[.]"45

5.

Kerr Appeals The Dismissal.

Kerr then appealed the dismissal to this Court on or about December 2, 2013. 46 The
Appeal was conditionally dismissed on December 31, 2013 for failure to comply with the Idaho
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 47 The District Court entered its final decision in the matter on
January 16, 2014. 48 Thereafter, Kerr filed an Amended Notice of Appeal on or about February
25, 2014. 49 Kerr filed a Second Amended Notice of Appeal on March 28, 2014 which was
finally accepted by this Court. 50
C.

Statement of Facts

On or about August 14, 2008, Jones obtained a mortgage loan from Stearns Lending, Inc.
in the amount of $210,225.00 on the Ammon Property. 51 The Deed of Trust identifies Steams
Lending, Inc. as the lender, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. ("MERS") as
beneficiary and nominee for the lender and lender's successors and assigns, and AmeriTitle as
Id.
R., p. 347.
46 R., pp. 349-350.
47 R., p. 359.
48 R., p. 353-354.
49 R., pp. 360-361.
so R., pp. 362-364.
51 See Affidavit of Amber N. Dina in Support of Motion for Judicial Notice, Ex. A included in
Augmented Record on Appeal.
44
45
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trustee. 52 Under the Deed of Trust, as the nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns,
MERS was empowered to exercise any of the rights of the Lender, including "the right to
foreclose and sell the Property." 53 On or about October 17, 2008, Jones executed a Quitclaim
Deed granting a one half interest in the Property to Kerr and his son Dennis Kerr. 54 The
Quitclaim Deed was recorded on July 2, 2012. 55 On or about September 1, 2009, Jones executed
a limited power of attorney in favor of Kerr allowing him "to talk to mortgage companies about
loans, and do utilities to the home and sign for certified mail, and things of this nature having to
do with the home and services etc. of the home." 56 The power of attorney was recorded on July
2, 2012. 57
Jones failed to make his monthly loan payments beginning in September of 2009. 58
MERS assigned its interest in the Deed of Trust to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP fka
Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP ("BACHLS") by a Corporation Assignment of Deed of
Trust ("Corporation Assignment") executed on January 15, 2010.
appointed ReconTrust as successor trustee. 59

On that day, BACHLS

ReconTrust issued a Notice of Default at the

election of Bank of America, N.A. Successor by Merger to BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP
FKA Countrywide Home Loans Servicing, LP on March 6 2012 due to Jones's failure to make

52

See id.
See id. at Ex.
54 See id. at Ex.
55 See id.
56 See id. at Ex.
57 See id.
58 See id. at Ex.
59 See id. at Ex.
53

A, p. 2.

F.
G.

D.
C.
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monthly mortgage payments smce September of 2009. 60

Thereafter, on March 16, 2012,

ReconTrust issued a Notice of Trustee's Sale setting the date of sale for July 24, 2012. 61
ReconTrust recorded its Affidavit of Service by Mail on June 29, 2012. 62

II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

Bank of America restates the issues on appeal as follows:
1.

Did Kerr waive all issues on appeal by failing to comply with Idaho Appellate

Rule 35(a)(6) where he failed to include citations to the record on appeal or to relevant legal
authorities?
2.

Did the District Court err in dismissing Kerr's Complaint where he failed to state

any claims and he filed parallel litigation on the same claims in another jurisdiction?
4.

Must the District Court be presumed to have acted properly in failing to grant

Kerr's Motion for Sanctions where Kerr failed to include the Motion in the record on appeal?

III.
A.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Motion for Summary Judgment.

"On appeal from the grant of a motion for summary judgment, this Court employs the
same standard as used by the district judge originally ruling on the motion." McFadden v. Sein,
139 Idaho 921,923, 88 P.3d 740, 742 (2004) (quoting Intermountain Forest Management, Inc. v.

Louisiana Pacific Corp., 136 Idaho 233, 235, 31 P.3d 921, 923 (2001)). Summary judgment is

See id. at Ex. D.
See id. at Ex. E.
62 See id.
60

61
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appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). The standard for reviewing a motion
for summary judgment is similar to the standard applicable to a motion to dismiss except that a
motion to dismiss is limited to review of the pleadings, whereas a review of a motion for
summary judgment encompasses evidence provided in support of the pleadings. See Young v.
City ofKetchum, 13 7 Idaho 102, 104, 44 P .3d 1157, 1159 (2002).

B.

Motion To Dismiss Under 12(b)(6).

Review of a district court's dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6) is de novo. Taylor v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 832, 243 P.3d 642, 648
(2010). When reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6),
"the non-moving party is entitled to have all inferences from the record viewed in [its] favor."

Young, 13 7 Idaho at 104, 44 P .3d at 1159.

After all such inferences have been drawn, a

dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is proper "when it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
prove no set of facts in support of [the] claim which would entitle [the plaintiff] to relief."

Harper v. Harper, 122 Idaho 535,536, 835 P.2d 1346, 1347 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing Wackerli v.
Martindale, 82 Idaho 400, 405, 353 P.2d 782, 787 (1960)).

If all factual allegations in the

complaint, even if true, are insufficient to demonstrate the elements of a claim then dismissal is
appropriate. Orrock v. Appleton, 147 Idaho 613, 618, 213 P.3d 398, 403 (2009). Even though
the Court must accept well-pled factual allegations as true, "it is not enough for a complaint to
make conclusory allegations." Owsley v. Idaho Industrial Comm 'n., 141 Idaho 129, 136, 106
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P.3d 455, 462 (2005) ("Although the non-movant is entitled to have his factual assertions treated
as true, this privilege does not extend to the conclusions of law the non-movant hopes the court
to draw from these facts.")
C.

Motion to Dismiss under 12(b)(8).

An appellate court reviews a district court's decision to dismiss an action pursuant to
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(8) for abuse of discretion. Johnson v. Johnson, 147 Idaho
912, 917, 216 P.3d 1284, 1289 (2009).

In making this determination, an appellate court

considers: "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise ofreason." Id.

IV.
A.

ARGUMENT

Kerr Waived All Issues on Appeal By Failing to Comply With the Idaho
Appellate Rules.

In accordance with Idaho Appellate Rule 35(a)(6), the argument section of an appellant's
opening brief must contain "the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented
on appeal, the reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript
and record relied upon." LA.R. 35(a)(6). This Court has stated that it will not search the record
on appeal for error; instead, an appellant must assert his assignments of error with particularity
and provide sufficient support for his arguments. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d
1146, 1152 (2010). "A general attack on the findings and conclusions of the District Court,
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without specific reference to evidentiary or legal errors, is insufficient to preserve an issue." Id.
(internal citation omitted).

Assignments of error which are not supported by argument and

citation to authority in the opening brief will not be considered on appeal.

Jorgensen v.

Coppedge, 145 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P .3d 450, 454 (2008). This rule is applied equally to pro se
litigants. See Twin Falls County v. Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003)
(stating "[p]ro se litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an
attorney."); see also Woods v. Sanders, 150 Idaho 53, 57, 244 P.3d 197, 201 (2010) ("Pro se
litigants are not accorded special consideration because they chose to represent themselves .... ").
Kerr's Opening Brief is severely deficient as it lacks any citations to the record on appeal.
Rather than identifying where he believes that the District Court erred, Kerr simply states "[t]he
Appellants position in this appeal is that the District Courts erred in every ruling it entered in the
case."63 This general attack on all of the proceedings in the case below is not sufficient to
demonstrate the errors of which Kerr is complaining.

Kerr fails to point to any specific

assignments of error or to present any plausible legal theories. Instead, Kerr repeatedly asserts
that he did not prevail below because the judges were bribed; however, he presents no evidence
for this spurious allegation.
Moreover, Kerr includes citations to only eleven cases in his brief. 64 Rather than use
those cases to support his arguments, he merely references the elements of the causes of action
asserted and concludes that there was specific evidence provided to the District Court to support

63
64

Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 5.
See id. at pp. 6-7
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his claims without discussing what evidence was presented and citing to it in the record. 65
Because Kerr failed to comply with the Idaho Appellate Rules, this Court should determine that
he has waived all issues on appeal.
B.

The District Court Property Dismissed Kerr's Complaint.
1.

The Court Properly Dismissed Kerr's Claims Regarding the Washoe
Property Due to the Existence of Parallel Litigation in Nevada.

Kerr's Complaint contains several allegations relating to property owned by his son
Dennis in Nevada. 66 Kerr specifically alleged that he filed litigation in Nevada in regard to the
trustee's sale of that property. 67 Consequently, in its Decision, the District Court refused to
consider any claims regarding Kerr's son's property in Washoe County, Nevada (the "Washoe
Property") because of the parallel litigation filed there by Kerr and because it had no jurisdiction
in Nevada. 68 The District Court's exercise of discretion in dismissing the claims relating to the
Washoe Property was proper and should not be overturned.
"Under I.R.C.P. 12(b)(8), a trial court may dismiss an action where there is 'another
action pending between the same parties for the same cause."' Klaue v. Hern, 133 Idaho 437,
439,988 P.2d 211,213 (1999). "A court may refrain from deciding a case where there is parallel
litigation elsewhere." Wing v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 106 Idaho 905, 908, 684 P.2d 307, 310
(Ct.App. 1984), overruled on other grounds by NBC Leasing Co. v. R&T Farms, Inc., 112 Idaho

See id.
R., pp. 16-1 7 (Bank of America "initiated an unlawfull [sic.] trustees sale on a Washoe County
that he never had a loan on ... "); pp. 18-19 ("The Defendants did intentionally libel slander the
Plaintiff making false statements and wrongly assessing that he did own a home in Reno ... ");
67 R., p. 11.
68 R., p. 82.
65

66
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500, 733 P.2d 721 (1987). In deciding whether to dismiss a lawsuit where a similar lawsuit is
pending in another court, the District Court should first consider whether the other case has gone
to judgment. See Klaue, 133 Idaho at 440, 988 P.2d at 214. If a final decision has been made
then the doctrines of issue preclusion or claim preclusion may apply.

See id.

Second, the

District Court should consider "whether the court, although not barred from deciding the case,
should nevertheless refrain from deciding it."

See id.

In doing so, the trial court should

"evaluate the identity of the real parties in interest and the degree to which the claims or interests
are similar." See id. (quoting Diet Ctr., Inc. v. Basford, 124 Idaho 20, 22-23, 855 P.2d 481, 483484 (Ct.App. 1993)). The trial court should also consider whether the court in which the other
matter is pending is in a position to determine the entire controversy. See id.
The claims raised by Kerr in his Complaint revolve around the allegedly unlawful trustee
sales of two properties: the Washoe Property and the Ammon Property. 69 Kerr alleges that, in
addition to the current litigation and the previous litigation in Bonneville County, he also filed
suit against BANA and ReconTrust in Washoe County, Nevada70 alleging "Bank of America
owns ReconTrust and together they did violate the Plaintiff, which resulted in the lawsuit in
Washoe County where the Plaintiff never had a loan with Bank of America, and was not on the
record as an owner, but was put on the trustees sale in Washoe County Nevada this August 20,
2012." 71 Kerr bases his claim for intentional interference with prospective economic damage on
the trustee sale of the Washoe Property. The District Court refused to address any portion of the
69

10
11

R., pp. 7-19.
R., p. 35.
R., p. 11.
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claims relating to the Washoe Property because Kerr alleged that there was a separate proceeding
in Nevada and the District Court would not have jurisdiction over claims arising in Nevada. 72
The District Court's properly exercised its discretion. The District Court considered
whether it should make a decision on the claims arising in Nevada which were subject to the
parallel action and decided that it had no jurisdiction over such claims.

Moreover, the

allegations of the claim in Nevada and the allegations relating to Kerr's third cause of action (for
interference with prospective economic advantage) are substantially similar; therefore, the court
in Nevada is in a position to determine those claims where the District Court was not. It is clear
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the claims relating to the Washoe
Property.

2.

The Court Properly Dismissed Kerr's Claims as Being Insufficiently
Pied.
a.

Kerr's First Cause of Action is Too Vague to Put Bank of
America on Notice as to What Kerr Actually Alleged.

In his first claim for relief, Kerr asserts that Bank of America violated the "Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act" ("FDCP A"), the "Deceptive Trade Practices Act, and the "Privacy
Act," because Bank of America "put wrongfull [sic.] collections on the Plaintiff['s] credit report
and sold his financial information and told other banks and mortgage companies not to do
business with the Plaintiff."

73

Kerr's first claim for relief is too vague to put Bank of America

on notice as to what Kerr actually alleged. He fails to specify what provisions of the named acts

72
73

R., p. 82.
R., p. 16.
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were violated or even on which laws he is basing his claims. Moreover, he fails to satisfy the
required elements of any claim that he might be attempting to allege. 74
i.

Kerr Fails to Specify Under Which Statutes His Claims
Arise.

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(l) requires "a short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). "'Although a complaint need not
identify the statutory basis for relief nor include a formal statement of the cause of action being
pursued, there must be some indication of the theory of recovery supporting the relief sought-a
naked recitation of the facts alone is insufficient." Brown v. City of Pocatello, 148 Idaho 802,
808, 229 P.3d 1164, 1170 (2010) (emphasis in original). "The key to a valid pleading is that it
must put the other party on notice of the claims against it." Mortensen v. Stewart Title Guaranty
Co., 149 Idaho 437,443,235 P.3d 387,393 (2010) (citing Youngblood v. Higbee, 145 Idaho 665,
668, 182 P.3d 1199, 1202 (2008).
The only act that Bank of America has been able to identify that is called the "Privacy
Act" is found in a federal statute. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. This statute only allows individuals to
bring claims against a federal agency. Id. at§ 552a(g)(l). Because this statute does not apply in
the context of a private corporation, Bank of America cannot ascertain what claims are actually

The District Court granted summary judgment based on res judicata on Kerr's First Claim for
Relief R., pp. 77-81. In reviewing the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the District
Court applied the summary judgment standard because it was required to look outside of the
operative Complaint to make a determination. Bank of America has chosen not to address res
judicata in this brief because, as found by the District Court, Kerr's first claim fails apart from
the doctrine of res judicata. See R., p. 78 ("Plaintiff has failed to meet the notice pleading
requirements with regard to his first claim.").
74
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being asserted against it. There is also no indication of what law Kerr is referring to as the
"Deceptive Trade Practices Act" and he provides no citation for this law either. That being the
case, Kerr's claims regarding the "Privacy Act" and the "Deceptive Trade Practices Act" must
fail as a matter oflaw.

ii.

Neither BANA nor ReconTrust is a Debt Collector
Under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.

Congress enacted the FDCP A "to eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt
collectors, to insure that those debt collectors who refrain from using abusive debt collection
practices are not competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to protect
consumers against debt collection abuses." 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e).

For a defendant to face

liability for violations of the FDCP A, it must be a "debt collector" within the meaning of the
statute. See, e.g., id. § 1692(f) ("A debt collector may not use unfair or unconscionable means
to collect or attempt to collect any debt"). To plead a claim for violation of the FDCPA, a
plaintiff must allege that (1) he has "been the object of collection activity arising from a
consumer debt," (2) "the defendant collecting the 'debt' is a 'debt collector'," and (3) "the
defendant has engaged in any act or omission in violation of the prohibitions or requirements of
the Act." Uyeda v. JA. Cambece Law Office, P.C., 2005 WL 1168421, at *3 (N.D.Cal. 2005)
(citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692(a), 1692(k)).
The FDCP A defines a "debt collector" as "any person ... who regularly collects or
attempts to collect.. .debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."

15 U.S.C.

§ 1692a(6). A "debt collector" does not include a person who collects or attempts to collect a
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debt "to the extent such activity ... concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was
obtained by such person."

15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(F).

The definition of "debt collector" is

narrow. Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, NA., 720 F.3d 1204, 1209 (9th Cir. 2013) (borrower's
complaint establishing that debt collection was only "some part of Wells Fargo's business [was]
insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA"; the entity must be a regular debt collector.).
Courts have routinely held, "a mortgagee and its assignee, including mortgage servicing
companies, are not debt collectors under the FDCP A when the debt is not in default at the time
the mortgage-holder acquires the debt." Fitzgerald v. PNCBank, 2011 WL 1542138, at *3 (D.
Idaho 2011) (internal citation omitted).
Kerr fails to allege any of the three primary elements required to state a claim under the
FDCP A. First, he does not allege that he was the object of any collection activity arising from a
consumer debt.

Second, he does not allege that either BANA or ReconTrust was a debt

collector. Third, he does not allege that either BANA or ReconTrust violated any provision of
the FDCPA. Because Kerr did not satisfy the requisite elements to state a claim for relief under
the FDCPA, this claim must also fail as a matter oflaw.

b.

Kerr's /CPA Claim Fails Because No Contract Exists Between
Himself and Either BANA or ReconTrust.

In his second claim for relief, Kerr asserts that Bank of America violated the "Consumer
Protection Act" and breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing by failing to implement
"Government's plan for modification." 75 Although Kerr fails to provide any citation for what he

75

R., p. 16.
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calls the "Consumer Protection Act," Bank of America assumes that he is referring to the Idaho
Consumer Protection Act ("ICP A") and will address the claim accordingly. Any claim under the
ICP A must fail because Kerr did not have a contract with BANA or ReconTrust. Moreover,
Kerr lacks standing to assert a claim for breach of an implied contractual covenant for the same
reason-no contract existed. Additionally, Kerr cannot assert a cause of action based on Jones's
contract with BANA because he is not authorized to do so by the power of attorney that he
obtained from Jones.
The ICP A permits recovery for specific, enumerated unfair or deceptive actions. Taylor

v. McNichols, 149 Idaho 826, 846, 243 P.3d 642,662 (2010); see I.C. § 48-603(1)-(19). To have
standing to assert a claim under the ICP A, "the aggrieved party must have been in a contractual
relationship with the party alleged to have acted unfairly or deceptively." Taylor, 149 Idaho at
846, 243 P.3d at 662; see also Haskins v. Glass, 102 Idaho 785, 788, 640 P.2d 1186, 1189
(Ct.App. 1982) (stating "[w]e hold ... that a claim under the ICPA must be based upon a
contract.").

Moreover, a defendant's conduct must fall within one of the statute's nineteen

subsections to be actionable. State v. Daicel Chem. Indus., Ltd., 141 Idaho 102, 107-108, 106
P.3d 428, 433-434 (2005).
A claim for bad faith can be based on either an independent tort claim or a breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in a contract. See White v. Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112
Idaho 94, 100, 730 P .2d 1014, 1020 (1986). A plaintiff cannot bring a bad faith claim based on a
tort in Idaho, except in the insurance context. Idaho First Nat'l Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc.,
121 Idaho 266, 275-6, 824 P.2d 841, 850-851 (1992). A plaintiff can state a claim for breach of
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the covenant of good faith and fair dealing only when a party "violates, nullifies or significantly
impairs any benefit of [a] contract." Jones v. Micron Tech, Inc., 129 Idaho 241, 923 P. 2d 486,
491-492 (Ct. App. 1996) (citation omitted); see also Bliss Valley Foods, 121 Idaho at 289, 824
P .2d at 864 ("A violation of the implied covenant is a breach of the contract. It does not result in
a cause of action separate from the breach of contract claims ... "). A claim for breach of the
implied covenant must directly relate to breach of a specific contract term. Bushi v. Sage Health

Care, PLLC, 146 Idaho 764, 768, 203 P.3d 694, 698 (2009) (holding there was no breach of
implied covenant where appellant could "identify no specific term within the operating
agreement that [r]espondents breached.").
Powers of attorney are strictly construed not to authorize acts beyond those specified.

Arthur v. Kilpatrick Bros. Co., 47 Idaho 306, 274 P. 800 (1929). "Where power is conferred on
an agent by a power of attorney, the meaning of general words in the instrument is restricted by
the context and construed accordingly and the authority given is construed strictly so as to
exclude the exercise of any power that is not warranted either by the terms actually used or as a
necessary means of executing with effect the authority given." 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency § 27.
In this case, Kerr lacks standing to assert any contract based claims. Kerr did not allege
that he was in a contractual relationship with either BANA or ReconTrust; therefore, Kerr cannot
state a claim for violation of the ICP A. Additionally, Kerr failed to allege what section of the
ICPA that Bank of America's purported conduct allegedly breached. There is no support for this
claim at all and it must be dismissed.
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Likewise, Kerr cannot assert a claim for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair
dealing without alleging the existence of a contract.

Not only must a contract exist, but a

plaintiff must be able to allege which provisions were allegedly violated. In this case, Kerr has
entirely failed to even allege the existence of any contract between himself and Bank of America.
Furthermore, neither Kerr's ICP A claim nor his claim for breach of the covenant of good
faith and fair dealing can be saved by the limited purpose power of attorney that was given to
Kerr by Jones. The Power of Attorney explicitly gives Kerr only the ability to "talk to mortgage
companies about loans, and do utilities to the home and sign for certified mail, and things of this
nature having to do with the home and services etc. of the home [3501 Madeline Drive]." 76 The
limited Power of Attorney does not authorize Kerr to institute legal proceedings on Jones's
behalf or to assume Jones's contract on the property. Kerr's second claim for relief therefore
must fail.

c.

Kerr's Interference with Prospective Economic Advantage Claim
Fails to Allege the Required Elements.

In his third claim for relief, Kerr alleges that Bank of America interfered with his

prospective economic advantage by initiating a trustee's sale on the Washoe Property. 77 This
claim fails because Kerr does not allege any of the required elements for asserting a claim for
interference with prospective economic advantage and because there is parallel litigation pending

See Affidavit of Amber N. Dina in Support of Motion for Judicial Notice, Ex. G included in
Augmented Record on Appeal.
77R., p. 17.
76
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in Nevada regarding the foreclosure of the Washoe Property. To the extent that this claim may
be read to relate to the Ammon Property, it is insufficiently pled.
To allege a claim of interference with a prospective economic advantage, a plaintiff must
show five separate elements: (1) the existence of a valid economic expectancy; (2) knowledge of
the expectancy on the part of the interferer; (3) intentional interference inducing termination of
the expectancy; (4) the interference was wrongful by some measure beyond the fact of the
interference itself; and (5) resulting damage to the plaintiff whose expectancy has been disrupted.

Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,893,243 P.3d 1069, 1081 (2010).
As previously discussed supra, the District Court refused to consider any claim arising in
Nevada due to the existing parallel litigation and its lack of jurisdiction over claims arising in
Nevada. Thus, the Court restricted its consideration of this claim to the Ammon Property. It
appears, however, that Kerr's third claim for relief is based entirely on the Washoe Property. If
Kerr's claim might somehow be interpreted to apply to the Ammon Property, it is evident that he
failed to meet any of the requirements.
First, Kerr does not clearly state what his valid economic interest in the property is apart
from Jones's quitclaim deed.

Second, the quitclaim deed on the Ammon Property was not

recorded until July of 2012. Bank of America instituted foreclosure proceedings in March of
2012 based on Jones's default of his mortgage obligations. There is no indication that Bank of
America received any notice of Kerr's alleged interest in the Ammon Property prior to the
recording of the quitclaim deed and Kerr made no allegations in regard to this factor. Third,
because Bank of America was not made aware of Kerr's interest in the Ammon Property prior to
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instituting foreclosure proceedings, the intent element is missing as well. Fourth, there is no
evidence that Bank of America's actions in enforcing its mortgage agreement with Jones were
wrongful in any way. Even if the other elements were present (which they are not), Kerr's claim
would fail based on this factor alone. Finally, Kerr has not alleged specifically what damage
resulted from the alleged interference. Therefore, this cause of action also fails as a matter of
law.
d.

Kerr's Intentional Infliction of Emotion Distress Claim Fails to
Allege the Required Elements.

In his fourth claim for relief, Kerr alleges that Bank of America's "bad faith and
malicious misconduct [caused] Plaintiff intentional infliction of emotional and financial
distress." 78 Kerr asserts that he has "indispensable facts that supports this claim for relief." 79 In
his Complaint, however, Kerr simply asserts a number of wild, conclusory accusations and
arbitrarily concludes that they were the result of conduct by Bank of America. Boiled down to
its essence, this claim appears to be based on the foreclosure proceedings instituted on the
Ammon Property as a result of Jones's breach of the mortgage agreement. Because Bank of
America was empowered by the mortgage contract to foreclose in the event of a breach, such
actions cannot support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

78
79

R., p. 17.
Id.
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i.

Kerr Does Not Allege Extreme or Outrageous Conduct
by Bank of America.

"To prevail on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress ["IIED"]: '(l) the
conduct must be intentional or reckless; (2) the conduct must be extreme and outrageous; (3)
there must be a causal connection between the wrongful conduct and the emotional distress; and
(4) the emotional distress must be severe."' Mortensen, 149 Idaho at 446, 235 P.3d at 396
(internal citation omitted). "Merely exercising a legal right does not satisfy the outrageousness
element of an emotional distress claim. To be actionable, the conduct must be ... extreme ·
... and 'must be more than unreasonable, unkind, or unfair."' Id. at 446-447, 235 P.3d at 396397 (internal citation omitted). "[T]he actor is never liable ... where he has done no more than
insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way, even though he is well aware that such
insistence is certain to cause emotional distress." Id. at 447, 235 P.3d 397 (holding insurance
company's exercise of its legal right to pay plaintiff the limit of his insurance policy rather than
pursuing further litigation was not extreme or outrageous conduct). "Justification for an award
of damages for emotional distress seems to lie not in whether distress was actually suffered by a
plaintiff, but rather the quantum of outrageousness of the defendant's conduct." Edmondson v.
Shearer Lumber Products, 139 Idaho 172, 179, 75 P.3d 733, 740 (2003) (Citing Brown v. Fritz,

108 Idaho 357, 362, 699 P.2d 1371, 1376 (1985)).

"Even if a defendant's conduct is

unjustifiable, it does not necessarily rise to the level of atrocious and beyond all possible bounds
of decency that would cause the average member of the community to believe it was
outrageous." Edmondson, 139 Idaho at 180, 75 P.3d at 741 (quotation marks omitted). Mere
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debt collection does not support an IIED claim. Archundia v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 2009 WL
1796295, at *7 (S.D. Cal. 2009). Additionally, to recover damages, emotional distress must be
accompanied by physical injury or physical manifestations of injury. Hopper v. Swinnerton, 155
Idaho 801, 317 P.3d 698, 707 (2013); see also Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126
Idaho 1002, 1007-8, 895 P.2d 1195, 1200-01 (1995) (noting that a plaintiff is prohibited from
recovery in tort for purely economic losses absent an accompanying physical injury to persons or
property, unique circumstances, or a special relationship.)
In this case, Kerr makes a number of unsubstantiated, conclusory claims of wrongdoing
against Bank of America. He fails, however, to demonstrate any causal connections between the
allegations and any conduct by Bank of America. Kerr contends that he suffered intentional
infliction of emotional distress due to Bank of America's actions in foreclosing upon Jones's
mortgage loan. Kerr does not contend, however, that Jones was not delinquent on the loan or
that Bank of America did anything that it was not empowered to do under the mortgage
documents that Jones executed. Bank of America simply instituted foreclosure proceedings on
the Ammon Property in response to Jones's breach of his obligations, which it was entitled to do
under the mortgage contract. In accordance with Idaho law, a defendant cannot be held liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress for simply enforcing its contractual rights.
Additionally, Kerr can point to no conduct undertaken by BANA or ReconTrust that
would qualify as outrageous or beyond the bounds of decency to substantiate his claim.
Moreover, Kerr does not allege any physical injury or physical manifestation of emotional
distress that can actually be causally linked to any actions by Bank of America. Although Kerr
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makes many allegations of poisonings at schools and restaurants and violent attacks on his
children by other children, he is unable to demonstrate that these injuries have been caused by
Bank of America or are related to Bank of America or its counsel in any way whatsoever.
ii.

Any Claim Of Bad Faith Must Fail Because No
Contract Exists between Kerr and Bank of America.

As previously discussed supra, Kerr cannot state a claim of bad faith without alleging
that a contract existed between himself and Bank of America. Thus, to the extent that his claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress is derivative of his "bad faith" claim, such claim
must be dismissed.
e.

Kerr's Civil Conspiracy Claim Fails to Allege the Existence of an
Agreement to Accomplish an Unlawful Objective.

In his fifth claim for relief, Kerr alleges that BANA and ReconTrust engaged in a civil

° Kerr's claim fails for

conspiracy that "the Plaintiff has the specific[s] totally documented." 8

numerous reasons. Kerr fails to allege the objective of the conspiracy or any unlawful acts
allegedly committed by BANA or ReconTrust in furtherance of the conspiracy. Moreover, Kerr
has provided no evidence of any sort of plan between BANA and ReconTrust to commit any
allegedly wrongful acts against him.
"A civil conspiracy that gives rise to legal remedies exists only if there is an agreement
between two or more to accomplish an unlawful objective or to accomplish a lawful objective in
an unlawful manner." Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc. v. Ernest, 149 Idaho 881, 898, 243 P.3d
1069, 1086 (2010) (quoting McPheters v. Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003)).

80

R., pp. 17-18.
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The essence of a civil conspiracy claim is the wrong committed as the objective or purpose of the
conspiracy, not the existence of the conspiracy itself. Id. However, in order to establish such a
claim, there must be "specific evidence of a plan or agreement to demonstrate the existence of
the conspiracy at the time the alleged unlawful objective was accomplished." Id. (quoting

Mannas v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 935, 155 P.3d 1166, 1174 (2007)). Civil conspiracy is not a
claim in itself, instead it is the wrongful acts of the co-conspirators resulting in injury that give
rise to a cause of action. See Hopper, 155 Idaho 801, 317 P.3d at 708.
Kerr appears to base his allegations of civil conspiracy on BANA's failure to offer Jones
a loan modification or to implement a loan modification that was allegedly approved for Jones. 81
Kerr also alleges that BANA put incorrect information on Dennis Kerr's mother's credit report to
doom a proposed short sale of the Ammon Property. 82

The rest of Kerr's allegations are

incomprehensible and seem to relate to injuries allegedly suffered by his youngest son. 83
Nowhere, however, does Kerr allege the existence of an agreement between BANA and
ReconTrust to commit wrongful acts against him. In fact, all of Kerr's allegations are targeted
solely at BANA; thus, no conspiracy exists as one cannot conspire with itself.
Kerr's cause of action for civil conspiracy must be dismissed.

81

R., pp. 14-15.

Id.
83 Id.
82
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Consequently,

f.

Kerr Cannot State a Claim Under the /CPA.

In his sixth claim for relief, Kerr asserts the "breach of the Idaho Deceptive Practices Act
along with the wrongfull [sic.], wanton, reckless, and intentional extreme malicious conduct
intitles [sic.] the Plaintiff to actual and punitive damages." 84 Although Kerr fails to provide a
citation for this claim, Bank of America infers, as did the District Court, that Kerr is attempting
to assert another claim under the Idaho Consumer Protection Act.

85

As discussed supra, Kerr's

claims under the ICP A fail because he has not alleged the existence of a contract between
himself and either BANA or ReconTrust. Therefore, this claim must also be dismissed as a
matter oflaw.

g.

Kerr's Defamation Claim Fails to Allege Publication of
Defamatory Information.

In his seventh claim for relief, Kerr asserts that Bank of America "did intentionally libel
slander the Plaintiff making false statements and wrongly assessing that he did own a home in
Reno and doing a trusstees [sic.] sale on that home and at the same time doing another wrongful
trustees sale on a home in Ammon, Idaho." 86 It is difficult to parse this cause of action to
understand what is being alleged. Regardless, however, it is evident that Kerr has failed to make
allegations sufficient to state a claim for defamation.
To prevail on a defamation action, "a plaintiff must prove that the defendant:
(1) communicated information concerning the plaintiff to others; (2) that the information was

R., p. 18.
R., pp. 85-86.
86 R.,p.18.
84

85
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defamatory; and (3) that the plaintiff was damaged because of the communication." Clark v. The
Spokesman-Review, 144 Idaho 427,430, 163 P.3d 216,219 (2007).

In this case, Kerr seems to allege that he was defamed by false statements imputing
ownership of the Washoe Property to him. As already discussed, the District Court refused to
rule on any claims relating to the pending parallel action in regards to the foreclosure of the
Washoe Property. Therefore, there is no basis for considering this claim, as stated by the District
Court.
Moreover, Kerr has not shown that BANA or ReconTrust communicated any information
about him to anyone regarding the Ammon Property or anything else. Furthermore, he has not
shown the substance of any of the alleged communications to establish their allegedly
defamatory character. Finally, he has not demonstrated that he has suffered any harm as a result
of any statements purportedly made by Bank of America. This claim is wholly deficient and
must therefore be dismissed.
C.

Because Kerr Failed to Include His Motion for Sanctions in the Record on
Appeal, the District Court Must Be Presumed to Have Acted Properly in Not
Granting Kerr's Motion.

Kerr asserts that Bank of America's attorneys paid for others to cause him physical
injury. 87 Kerr further alleges that the District Court abused its discretion by not acting upon the
Motion for Sanctions that he filed as a result. 88 The District Court docket shows that Kerr filed

87

88

See Appellant's Opening Brief, p. 6.
See id.
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one Motion for Sanctions on July 30, 2013. 89 Kerr, however, did not designate his Motion for
Sanctions as a document to be included in the record on appeal in his Notice of Appeal, nor did
he file a Motion to Augment the Record with this document; thus, because Kerr has failed to
provide an adequate record for review, the District Court must be presumed to have validly
exercised its discretion in not granting Kerr's Motion for Sanctions.
Idaho Appellate Rule 17(i) provides that an appellant shall designate any documents to be
included in the clerk's record, in addition to those that are to be included automatically under
Rule 28, in his Notice of Appeal. I.A.R. 17(i). Rule 30 allows any party to move the Supreme
Court to augment the clerk's record. I.A.R. 30. The appellate court is bound by the record on
appeal and cannot consider matters not contained therein. See State ex. rel. Ohman v. Ivan H

Talbot Family Trust, 120 Idaho 825, 827, 820 P.2d 695, 697 (1991). It is the obligation of the
appellant to provide a "sufficient record on appeal to substantiate his or her claims[.]" Belk v.

Martin, 136 Idaho 652, 660, 39 P.3d 592, 600 (2001) (quoting State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489,
491, 988 P.2d 715, 717 (Ct. App. 1999)). Where the appellant fails to provide an adequate
record for the appellate court to review the discretionary acts of the trial court, "the trial court
must be presumed to have acted properly and sustained." Farmers Nat 'l Bank v. Shirey, 126
Idaho 63, 72, 878 P.2d 762, 771 (1994) (quoting Rutter v. McLaughlin, 101 Idaho 292,293, 612
P.2d 135, 136 (1980)). A trial court's decision of whether or not to impose sanctions is within its
discretion and such decision will not be overturned on review absent an abuse of that discretion.

Fish Haven Resort, Inc. v. Arnold, 121 Idaho 118,121,822 P.2d 1015, 1018 (1991).
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Kerr contends that the District Court erred in failing to grant his Motion for Sanctions

° Kerr, however, failed to designate his Motion for

filed against Bank of America's counsel. 9

Sanctions as a document to be included in the clerk's record in accordance with the Idaho
Appellate Rules.

Idaho law clearly demonstrates that it was Kerr's burden to provide an

adequate record upon which this Court could base its review of his assignments of error. Kerr
failed to provide an adequate record to review the District Court's actions regarding his Motion
for Sanctions; therefore, the District Court's actions in this regard must be presumed to be proper
and sustained.
V.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Bank of America respectfully requests that this Court uphold
the District Court's decision dismissing Kerr's Complaint.
Respectfully submitted this 18th day of August, 2014.
GIVENS PURSLEY LLP

By:--=....::...:..=
Kelly Greene McConnell
Amber N. Dina
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 18th day of August, 2014, the foregoing was served as
follows:

Terry Kerr
2895 Woodbridge Circle
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83401
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